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TAX LIABILITY OF AN
AIR RIGHTS CONVEYANCE
In Macht v. Department of Assessments,1 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland considered the tax liability of an air rights conveyance.
In 1961, the Charles Street Development Corporation decided to con-
struct a multi-storied office building on property immediately west of
the property owned by plaintiffs. In order to insure an unimpeded
access to light and air on the building's east face, the corporation
acquired, by lease, exclusive rights to the airspace 124 feet over plain-
tiffs' property. Because of procedural delays, the air rights lease was
not valued and placed on the assessment rolls until the tax year end-
ing June 30, 1969. The assessment, designated as "Air Rights Only,"
was a separate assessment made in addition to one previously made
on the property. Plaintiffs protested. In affirming the Maryland Tax
Court, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that airspace super-
adjacent to property may be subject to state and local property taxes
and separately valued for assessment purposes.
Prior to considering the validity of the Department's action, the
court examined the nature of the landowner's proprietary rights in
the airspace superadjacent to his land. These rights derive from the
ancient common law maxim cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum
et ad inferos,2 extending ownership of the surface land indefinitely
upward and downward. This maxim of "infinite ownership"' has,
however, been necessarily modified by technological developments in
air navigation and commerce.4 One of the first major decisions limit.
1. 266 Md. 602, 296 A.2d 162 (1972).
2. "To whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the
depths." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 453 (4th ed. 1968). See Bouv6, Private
Ownership of Air Space, 1 AIR L. Rav. 232 (1930); Cooper, Roman Law and
the Maxim Cujus est Solum in International Law, 1 M GILL L.J. 23 (1952);
Gorove, On the Threshhold of Space: Toward a Cosmic Law, 4 N.Y.L.F. 305,
311-13 (1958); Lardone, Airspace Rights in Roman Law, 2 Am L. Rlv. 455,
461 (1931); Sweeney, Adjusting the Conflicting Interests of Landowner and
Aviator in Anglo-American Law, 3 J. Am L. 329, 347-73 (1932). See also cases
collected in 73 C.J.S. Property § 13b(2)(a) (1951).
3. Comment, The Interest of the Occupier of Land in Superjacent Space-The
New York View, 4 N.Y.L.F. 350, 352-54 (1958).
4. Justice Douglas in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946),
concluded "that doctrine has no place in the modem world."
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ing the extent of the doctrine was Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp.'
The court there concluded that the surface owner had a dominant
right of occupancy for purposes incidental to the use and enjoyment
of the surface. As to the upper stratum, he has no right except to
prevent its use by others resulting in an unreasonable interference
with his complete enjoyment. The issue continued to be a source of
repeated litigationG until the Supreme Court decision of United States
v. Causby.7 In Causby, the Court ruled that the landowner "owns at
least as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use
in connection with the land,"8 the balance being regarded as open,
publicly navigable airspace.
In addition to the case law, a significant number of states provide
by statute9 that "the ownership of the space above the lands and
waters of the state is vested in the several owners of the surface sub.
ject to the rights of air flight."0 Thus, whether based on case or
statutory authority, virtually all jurisdictions regard the surface owner
as owner of the superadjacent airspace to that reasonable height
necessary for the full use and enjoyment of the land below, limited
only by federal aviation, state property and local zoning regulations.
Although the concept of ownership may be well established, the
validity of a conveyance of undeveloped airspace as a solid mass of
5. 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932).
6. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944); Hinman v.
Pacific Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936); Cory v. Physical Culture
Hotel, 14 F. Supp. 977 (W.D.N.Y. 1936); Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga.
862, 20 S.E.2d 245 (1942); Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E.
817 (1934); Burnham v. Beverly Airways, 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575 (1942);
Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930);
Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Dunlop, 148 Misc. 849, 266 N.Y.S. 469 (Monroe
County Ct. 1933).
7. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
8. Id. at 264. Furthermore, the Court continued that the landowner owns as
much of the airspace as he can occupy, even though he does not occupy it in a
physical sense. Id.
9. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. I(a), § 7 (1957).
10. At least 22 states have adopted similar provisions based on the Uni-
form State Law for Aeronautics § 3, 11 UNiF. LAws ANN. 160 (1938) (with-
drawn). See Hunter, The Conflicting Interests of Airport Owner and Nearby
Property Owner, 11 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 539, 547 (1945).
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real property" has not been specifically litigated.12 The right to sub-
divide and convey has, however, been recognized by statute in several
states.13 As to the remainder, there seems to be little reason for not
affirming such conveyances if challenged. First, virtually all com-
mentators support the concept of horizontal subdivision and con-
veyance of airspace.14 Second, policy considerations favor their rec-
ognition. Concepts of controlled vertical expansion and utilization
of superadjacent airspace provide vast opportunities for the redevel-
opment of congested urban areas.1 5 Finally, as a practical matter,
11. Air rights may be defined as the right to occupy the space above a speci-
fied plane over a designated tract of land. Only the airspace as described in three
dimensions and not the gaseous air itself can be conveyed. Brennan, Lots of Air-
A Subdivision in the Sky, 1955 ABA SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY PROBATE AND
TRUST LAW PROCEEDINGS 24.
12. Some decisions have been interpreted as uniformly holding that convey-
ances of freehold estates non-contiguous to land are valid; see Cheeseborough v.
Green, 10 Conn. 318, 26 Am. Dec. 396 (1834); City of Chicago v. Sexton, 408
I11. 351, 97 N.E.2d 287 (1951): Madison v. Madison, 206 Ill. 534, 69 N.E. 625
(1903), Metropolitan W. Side Elevated R.R. v. Springer, 171 Ill. 170, 49 N.E.
416 (1897); McConnel v. Kibbe, 43 Ill. 12, 92 Am. Dec. 93 (1867); Loring
v. Bacon, 4 Mass. 575 (1808); R.M. Cobban Realty Co. v. Donlan, 51 Mont.
58, 149 P. 484 (1915); Piper v. Taylor, 48 N.D. 967, 188 N.W. 171 (1922);
Pearson v. Matheson, 102 S.C. 377, 86 S.E. 1063 (1915); Townes v. Cox, 162
Tenn. 624, 39 S.W.2d 749 (1931); Taft v. Washington Mut. Say. Bank, 127
Wash. 503, 221 P. 604 (1923).
13. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. 118-12-1 (1963); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 114, §
174a (1954); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:3-19 to 22 (1940); PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 68,
§§ 801-05 (1965). The statutes provide that interests in airspace may be pos-
sessed, conveyed, devised, taxed, and in all respects treated as property.
14. Note, Conveyance and Taxation of Air Rights, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 338,
340-42 (1964). Horizontal subdivision and conveyance has been analogized to
(I) reservation of a fee interest in property, (2) conveyances of fee interests in
the upper stories of buildings, (3) the three-dimensional concept characterized
by the condominium. See also Ball, Division Into Horizontal Strata of the Land-
space Above the Surface, 39 YALE L.J. 616 (1930); Ball, The Vertical Extent
of Ownership in Land, 76 U. PA. L. REv. 631 (1928); Barnhill, The Creation
of Estates in Airspace, 25 RoCKY MT. L. Rnv. 354 (1953); Bell, Air Rights:
Prospects for the Future, 23 ILL. L. REv. 250 (1928); Mace, Ownership of Air-
space, 17 U. CIN. L. REv. 343 (1948); Richardson, Private Property Rights in
the Airspace at Common Law, 31 CAN. B. REv. 117 (1953); Comment, Property
-Things Subject to Ownership-Statute Permitting Creation of Estates in Air-
space, 52 HARv. L. REv. 335 (1938); Comment, The Interest of Occupier of
Land in Superjacent Space-The New York View, 4 N.Y.L.F. 350 (1958); Note,
Airspace: A New Dimension in Property Law, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 303; Comment,
Air Rights, 6 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REV. 65 (1969).
15. Davis, Air Rights Development: Legal Aspects and Effects on Land Use,
2 LAND-USE CONTROLS 1 (1968); Mayer, Air-Rights Development on Down-
town Chicago's Lakefront, I LAND-USE CONTROLS 1 (1967); Comment, Leasing
of Air Space Above Public Buildings-The Public Use Doctrine and Other Prob-
lems, 28 U. PITT. L. REv. 661 (1967).
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leases and sales, which first appeared in the larger cities decades ago,
have continued to take place in increasing numbers without objec-
tion.16 Based on the "prevailing authority," the Maryland court will-
ingly recognized the validity of the air rights conveyance. 17
The court next turned to the principal issue raised by plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs argued that the separate assessment of "Air Rights Only"
was unauthorized and illegal. Generally, the power to tax may be
exercised by the state legislature subject only to those limitations im-
posed by the federal and state constitutions.28 Included among the
taxing powers is the power to provide for the separate classification
and assessment of all taxable property within the state.10 Although
plenary in nature, certain aspects of the taxing process may be dele-
gated to governmental departments and officers. 20 Any delegation of
power, however, must be expressly and distinctly stated, and exercised
in strict conformity with the grant.21 In the absence of such express
authorization, no delegation of power will be recognized or implied.
Thus, if the state legislature has not expressly stated that the assess-
ing authority shall have the power to classify property for assessment
purposes, the authority is without power to do so. Although the
General Assembly of Maryland can provide for the separate assess-
ment of air rights apart from other rights and interests held by the
landowner, it has chosen not to do so. Since the General Assembly had
16. F. HoRACK & V. NOLAN, LAND USE CONTROLS 118-19 (1954).
17. 266 Md. at 613, 296 A.2d at 168, citing 52 Op. AT'Y GnN. 425, 426
(1967).
18. People ex rel. Bailey v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 407 Ill. 426, 435-36, 95 N.E.2d
352, 357 (1950); Diana Shoe Stores Co. v. Department of Revenue, 5 I1. 2d 112,
114, 125 N.E.2d 71, 72 (1955); State Tax Comm'n v. Gales, 222 Md. 543, 549,
161 A.2d 676, 679 (1960); Mayor of Baltimore v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,
97 Md. 659, 662, 55 A. 316, 317 (1903); General Installation Co. v. University
City, 379 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Mo. 1964); Giers Improvement Corp. v. Investment
Serv., Inc., 361 Mo. 504, 510, 235 S.W.2d 355, 358 (1951).
19. Abrams v. City of San Francisco, 48 Cal. App. 2d 1, 119 P.2d 197 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1941); State Tax Comm'n v. Gales, 222 Md. 543, 549, 161 A.2d 676,
679 (1960); Williams v. City of Madison, 15 Wis. 2d 430, 113 N.W.2d 395
(1962). As in all areas pertaining to the formulation of tax policy, legislatures
have wide discretion in classifying property limited only by the requirements
that such classification be reasonable and not arbitrary. See Madden v. Kentucky,
309 U.S. 83, 88 (1939); see also 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 36(a) (1954).
20. Sommers v. Patton, 399 Ill. 540, 544-45, 78 N.E.2d 313, 316 (1948);
United States Steel Corp. v. Gerosa, 7 N.Y.2d 454, 459, 166 N.E.2d 489, 491,
199 N.Y.S.2d 475, 478 (1960); English v. Robinson Township School Dist., 358
Pa. 45, 49, 55 A.2d 803, 807 (1947).
21. Comptroller of Treasury v. M.E. Rockhill, Inc., 205 Md. 226, 232-33, 107
A.2d 93, 98 (1958).
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not authorized the Department to make a separate valuation and
assessment, plaintiffs maintained that the Department was not em-
powered to separately assess the conveyance. The issue before the
court concerned the ability of the Department to levy a special assess-
ment on property, supposedly taxed previously, in order to collect
the total amount of taxes that should have been paid.
Included among those responsibilities generally delegated is the
appraisal of all taxable property within the appropriate jurisdiction
and its placement on the assessment rolls. Where the method of prop-
erty valuation is prescribed by statute, the assessing authority must
act accordingly.- One of the most common methods is the unitary
plan whereby land and improvements are regarded and valued as a
single assessment. In this case, a separate calculation of value on each
is procedural only and does not mean that there has been an individ-
ual assessment and valuation of each. The value of the property,
land and improvements together, is the only assessed value attached
to the particular piece of real estate.2 3 A second method is the com-
ponent plan, whereby land and improvements are valued separately.
Accordingly, the assessor determines the value of the land, determines
the value of the improvements, then adds the two components to-
gether. This aggregate sum is the assessed value and is the only assess-
ment made against the taxpayer's property.24
Occasionally, taxable property is omitted from assessment and
escapes taxation. Provisions have been adopted, however, in many
states by which such omitted property may be subsequently placed
on the assessment roll and taxed.25 The method prescribed in valuing
and assessing property is critical in determining the tax liability of
property not included in the original assessment.
22. County of Sacramento v. Hickman, 66 Cal. 2d 841, 848, 428 P.2d 593,
596, 59 Cal. Rptr. 609, 611-12 (1967); Smith v. Davis, 426 S.W.2d 827, 834
(Tex. 1968). The assessor has, however, a reasonable degree of latitude in
selecting the method used to calculate the value of each individual component
of property. The only requirement is that the valuation reflect the fair cash
market or full and true value. The three methods commonly used are (1) market
data, (2) depreciation-replacement cost, (3) capitalization of earnings. The
capitalization method used in valuing income-producing property was the method
used in Macht. See Overstreet v. Brickell Lum Corp., 262 So. 2d 707 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1972); Bornstein v. State Tax Comm'n, 222 Md. 331, 176 A.2d 859
(1962); Crossroads Center, Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 286 Minn. 440, 176
N.W.2d 530 (1970); R. BABcocK, THE VALUATION OF REAL ESTATE 167 (1932).
23. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 192.001 (12)-.011 (1971).
24. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(a) (1957).
25. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 34 (1957).
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For example, Oklahoma has adopted a unitary plan providing for
the assessment of realty, not the separate assessment of land and im-
provements.2 6 In Roberts v. Fair,27 certain buildings were overlooked
when the land on which they were located was assessed. The court
held that once either the land or improvements were assessed, the
whole property was valued. "Any attempt to add more taxes to those
already assessed .. . is an attempt to . ..revalue and reassess real
property that has been undervalued ....,28
In Whited v. Louisiana Tax Commission,29 the taxing authorities
attempted to make a supplemental assessment on certain buildings
erected subsequent to the assessment of the land. Although the assess-
ment sheet had separate columns for the valuation of improvements,
the Louisiana statute30 required taxation of realty as a whole. The
court held that the buildings were to be taxed as part of the realty
and were "not omitted because they were necessarily included, with-
out mention of them, in the assessment of the lots on which they
were built."3'
In the Washington case of Hammond Lumber Co. v. Cowlitz
County,32 the assessor negligently omitted a logging railroad located
on taxpayer's property. The Washington court held that the addi-
tional assessment placed on the railroad as omitted property was
improper as it constituted double taxation. The court concluded:
"[A]s it was then existent upon the land, it was plainly discernable
to the assessing officer upon examining the land as a house, a tree,
or fence would be."33
The Washington court reached the same conclusion in Tradewell
26. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68 § 2419 (1966).
27. 174 Okla. 139, 50 P.2d 152 (1935).
28. Id. at 142, 50 P.2d at 155.
29. 178 La. 877, 152 So. 552 (1934).
30. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:1958 (1952).
31. 178 La. at 884, 152 So. at 554.
32. 84 Wash. 462, 147 P. 19 (1915).
33. Id. at 466, 147 P. at 20-21. See also Wolf v. Thomas, 1 Ind. App. 232,27
N.E. 578 (1891); Davidson v. Franklin Ave. Inv. Co., 129 Minn. 87, 151
N.W. 537 (1915) (building); Palmer v. Beadle Co., 70 S.D. 99, 15 N.W.2d 6
(1944); E.K. Wood Lumber Co. v. Whatcom County, 5 Wash. 2d 63, 104 P.2d
752 (1940) (standing timber). "Where a valid assessment has been made by an
assessor cognizant of the facts, undervaluation is ordinarily not grounds for
another assessment." Builders Components Supply Co. v. Cockayne, 22 Utah 2d
172, 173, 450 P.2d 97, 98 (1969).
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Stores v. Snohomish County.'4 In Tradewell, the taxpayer acquired
several single family residences, destroyed them and constructed a
supermarket in their place. The improvement on the land, however,
was still carried at the lower value of the residences. In denying the
assessor's attempt to cure the error by a later assessment of the super-
market, the court stated that the assessment did not constitute a list-
ing and valuation of omitted property, but rather a reassessment of
omitted value of property already listed.
The nature of its omitted property statute35 has come before the
New Mexico courts. In Vermejo Club v. French,36 the assessment
failed to include timber standing on the land. To correct the error,
the assessor levied a tax on the timber as omitted property. The court,
recognizing that the timber was at all times a part of the realty, held
that property once assessed could not be revalued. In Taylor v. Shaw,37
however, the court observed by way of dictum that overlooked im-
provements may be added as omitted property: "The Assessor could,
and should, if he finds the improvements to have been placed upon
the property... and not theretofore valued, place them upon the tax
rolls ... that taxes might be collected thereupon."''
A holding similar to the Taylor dictum was announced in the
Florida case of Korash v. Mills.39 In Florida, the statute4 requires
a single assessment and generally does not permit land and im-
provements to be assessed separately. The Assessor, however, sep-
arately assessed a motel that had escaped previous assessment and
taxation due to clerical error. 41 In upholding the separate assessment,
the Florida court said the assessment constituted an initial assess-
ment placed upon an improvement that had previously escaped taxa-
tion, not a new judgment by the assessor or revaluation of property
previously valued and listed. The court concluded: "We agree that
single assessments are the usual case and should be employed," 42 but
34. 69 Wash. 2d 352, 418 P.2d 466 (1966).
35. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-2-42, 72-8-3 (1953).
36. 43 N.M. 45, 85 P.2d 90 (1938).
37. 48 N.M. 395, 151 P.2d 743 (1944).
38. Id. at 399, 151 P.2d at 745.
39. 263 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1972).
40. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 192.001(12)-.011 (1971).
41. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 197.011 (1971) states that a separate assessment may
be warranted only in the case of a clerical error. The class of clerical error that
would permit a separate assessment is strictly limited and was not of the type
that occurred in this case.
42. 263 So. 2d at 582.
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the taxpayer cannot blithely assert refined definitions of single assess-
ment.43 The separate assessment is a case of "de minimus non curat
lex."44
As previously stated, some states have adopted the component
method of valuation. The use of the component plan results in a
different treatment of omitted property. Illinois45 and California40
cases indicate that where individual assessments of land and improve-
ments are authorized and either one has been taxed but undervalued,
it cannot be reassessed as omitted property. If either has been entirely
omitted from taxation, however, it can later be added to the assess-
ment roll and taxed.
The foregoing discussion indicates that the prescribed method of
assessment determines the tax liability of omitted property. If land
and improvements are assessed as a single entity, the general rule is
that unassessed improvements cannot be later assessed as omitted
property. Land and improvements become one and an assessment of
one constitutes an assessment of both. The Korash decision, how-
ever, suggests that exceptions to this general rule may be warranted
in certain circumstances. Their suggestion is based upon an analysis
of assessment and omitted property statutes similar to that of the
"component" jurisdictions. If land and improvements are assessed
separately as individual components, that component completely
overlooked can still be assessed. In this case, the essential require-
ment is that there be a clear showing of a previous failure to tax.
The decision of the Maryland court was based primarily on a con-
sideration of the above. In examining the Department's action, the
court first turned to the Maryland constitution and code. The con-
stitution provides that the power to separately classify and assess
property remains exclusively that of the General Assembly.47 Although
the General Assembly has provided for the separate assessment of
land and improvements,48 it has not declared that air rights are to
43. Id.
44. Id. "Justice may be 'blind,' but it is not stupid." Id.
45. People ex rel. McDonough v. Birtman Elec. Co., 359 Ill. 143, 194 N.E.
282 (1934).
46. Jenson v. Byram, 229 Cal. App. 2d 651, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 540 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1964); Stafford v. Riverside County, 155 Cal. App. 2d 474, 318 P.2d 474
(Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
47. Mo. DFCLARATION OF RiGHTS art. 15.
48. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(a) (1966).
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be assessed separately and apart from other interests in land. Plain-
tiffs maintained that the prior assessment of the land included all
those rights incident to its ownership, including the rights in the
superadjacent airspace; that the Department could not again make
a separate assessment of "Air Rights Only." It was apparent to the
court, however, that plaintiffs incorrectly characterized the Depart-
ment's action.
The court explained that the fee simple owner of land holds all
the elements of a single right, comparable to a "bundle of sticks."
Included within this bundle is the right to utilize the superadjacent
airspace. Furthermore, for the purpose of taxation, property includes
not only the land and improvements thereon, but also those rights,
privileges, powers and interests incident to ownership and upon which
it is practical to place a money value.49 For assessment purposes, a
proper valuation must include "all interests in the property except
when the legislature authorizes the assessment to separate interests."' 0
So long as plaintiffs "made no use of the airspace over their prop-
erty, it was not, nor could it be made the subject of assessment."51 It
was a right upon which it was impractical to place a monetary value.
Once plaintiffs, however, conveyed the airspace for a price, it became
income-producing, acquiring value and becoming capable of assess-
ment for tax purposes. Whether characterized as an easement, license
or profit t prendre,5 2 the practical effect of the lease was to enhance
the value of plaintiffs' "servient" estate by the rent reserved. The en-
hanced value was a proper element to be considered in determining
plaintiffs' tax liability.
The court concluded that there is "no reason why land, improve-
ments and airspace could not be separately valued for assessment
purposes."' 3 It relied on its earlier decision of Susquehanna Power
Co. v. Tax Commission," which held that the separation of owner-
49. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 268 (1932); Samet
v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 247 F. 669, 671 (4th Cir. 1917). See also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1382 (4th ed. 1968).
50. Overstreet v. Brickell Lum Corp., 262 So. 2d 707, 709 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972), citing Homer v. Dadeland Shopping Center, Inc., 229 So. 2d 834,
837 (Fla. 1969).
51. 266 Md. at 613, 296 A.2d at 168.
52. Id. at 612, 296 A.2d at 168.
53. Id. at 610, 296 A.2d at 167.
54. 159 Md. 334, 151 A. 29 (1930), aff'd, 283 U.S. 291 (1931).
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ship rights into component parts and their separate valuation was
not unjust to the taxpayer so long as the value of the component
parts did not exceed the value of the whole. "Whether the value of
the airspace was separated out or included in the valuation of the
fee ... is indeed a distinction without a difference."' 5
The court's analysis of the Department's action is similar to that
of other jurisdictions regarding omitted property. The court has
emphasized the distinction between an unauthorized separate classi-
fication and assessment resulting in a mere reassessment of omitted
value, and the authorized assessment of a new element of property
not previously assessed. As the air rights conveyance had entirely
escaped any previous assessment, the Department's later assessment
was not prohibited by the Maryland constitution or code. The court
has suggested that a failure to levy an assessment on an element of
property unknown to the assessor at the time of the assessment, and
its subsequent assessment, does not constitute an unauthorized re-
assessment. Neither does the valuation of an element of property
constitute a separate classification.
State legislatures provide by statute the procedures by which all
property within the state may be assessed and taxed. Precise inter-
pretation and application, especially of those statutes regarding re-
assessment and omitted property, are often confusing. The Macht
decision represents an attempt by the court to resolve this confusion
in a manner consistent with the basic principles of taxation. The
constitutional basis of the property tax is that the taxpayer must
bear his proportionate share in the support of the state from which
he has derived certain benefits and protection. The guiding principle
is equality and uniformity in taxation.-G In this way, the burden is
distributed over all property, requiring the taxpayer to contribute
only that amount proportionate to the actual value of his property.t7
Courts recognize that it would be inequitable and unjust to grant a
55. 266 Md. at 616, 296 A.2d at 170.
56. The established rule is that property is to be taxed according to its value,
the rationale being that this prohibits arbitrary and capricious modes of taxation(offensive to the equal protection and due process clauses), and promotes equality
and uniformity. See People ex tel. Tedrick v. Allied Oil Corp., 388 I1. 219, 57
N.E.2d 859 (1944); People ex rel. Toman v. Chicago Union Station Co., 383 Ill.
153, 48 N.E.2d 524 (1943); Smith v. Davis, 426 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1968).
57. Mayor of Baltimore v. Minister of Starr Methodist Protestant Church, 106
Md. 281, 67 A. 261 (1907); State v. Sterling, 20 Md. 502 (1864).
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"knowing" taxpayer a windfall at the expense of his fellow taxpayers.
In a case of doubt regarding the interpretation of statutes levying
taxes, they are construed most strongly against the government in
favor of the citizen.58 They are not, however, to be so construed as
to permit a taxpayer to avoid a just and proper assessment.
Scott A. Raisher
58. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917).
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